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A Bayesian technique with analyses of within-person processes at the level of the
individual is presented. The approach is used to examine whether the patterns of
within-person responses on a 12-trial simulation task are consistent with the predictions
of ITA theory (Dweck, 1999). ITA theory states that the performance of an individual with
an entity theory of ability is more likely to spiral down following a failure experience than the
performance of an individual with an incremental theory of ability. This is because entity
theorists interpret failure experiences as evidence of a lack of ability which they believe
is largely innate and therefore relatively fixed; whilst incremental theorists believe in the
malleability of abilities and interpret failure experiences as evidence of more controllable
factors such as poor strategy or lack of effort. The results of our analyses support
ITA theory at both the within- and between-person levels of analyses and demonstrate
the benefits of Bayesian techniques for the analysis of within-person processes. These
include more formal specification of the theory and the ability to draw inferences about
each individual, which allows for more nuanced interpretations of individuals within a
personality category, such as differences in the individual probabilities of spiraling. While
Bayesian techniques have many potential advantages for the analyses of processes at
the level of the individual, ease of use is not one of them for psychologists trained in
traditional frequentist statistical techniques.
Keywords: bayesian statistics, implicit theories, mindsets, within-person, personality processes, performance
spiraling, simulations
1. INTRODUCTION
Psychological reports based on the study of between-person effects often characterize the results as
relating to individual level within-person processes. For example, Blackwell et al. (2007) describe
how, relative to those with an entity or fixed view, individuals with an incremental or developmental
view of intelligence “display mastery-oriented strategies (effort escalation or strategy change)
vs. helplessness strategies (effort withdrawal or strategy perseveration) in the face of setbacks”
(Blackwell et al., 2007, p. 247). The implication for most readers is that an individual with an
incremental view of intelligence will respond to an incident of failure or setback with a mastery
oriented strategy, and that an individual with an entity view of intelligence will respond to an
incident of failure or setback with a helplessness strategy. The argument that the views, mindsets or
beliefs held by individuals shape their reactions to situations, such as failure and setbacks, has been
Cripps et al. Bayesian Analysis of Personality Dynamics
tested for a range of latent variables, including, for example, the
ideal vs. ought self (Higgins et al., 1994), learning vs. performance
goal orientations (Elliott and Dweck, 1988), external vs. internal
locus of control (Paulhus, 1983) and cultural group processes (Na
et al., 2010). In each of these cases, the argument is made that
the prior view of each individual influences his or her pattern
of responses, but the effects are tested at the group level using
aggregate statistics such as means, variances and correlations.
Thus, statistical inferences regarding between-person differences
are used to imply the existence of dynamic within-person
processes.
While it is possible that the average pattern of responses
observed at the group level will also be observed at the individual
level, this cannot be assumed without testing at the individual
level (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1985; Borsboom et al., 2003; Grice,
2015). As noted byGrice (2015, p. 1)many relationships observed
at the group level do not replicate at the level of the individual,
such as the structure of the Big 5 (Grice et al., 2006; Beckmann
et al., 2010) and the Power Law of Learning (Heathcote et al.,
2000). While this fact is widely recognized and frequently
discussed (e.g., Nezlek, 2001; Schmitz, 2006), a barrier to testing
models of psychological processes at the individual level has been
an over reliance on the aggregate frequentist statistics of means,
variances and correlations that require sample sizes greater than
one (Danziger, 1990; Grice, 2015). As a result, the study of
individual level processes using, for example, case studies or
individual time series to capture the dynamics of within-person
processes, such as those described by Blackwell et al. (2007) for
entity theorists and incremental theorists, has received relatively
little attention until recently.
In more recent times, the collection of individual level time
series data with repeated observations of the psychological states
and behaviors at multiple time points has been facilitated through
the development and application of simulations (Wood et al.,
2009; Beckmann et al., 2012) and experience sampling methods
(e.g., Minbashian et al., 2010; Fisher and To, 2012). The analyses
of these individual time series has been associated with an
increased use of growth curve modeling techniques, including
latent curve modeling (LCM; e.g., Goodman et al., 2011) and
growth mixture models (GMM; e.g., Grimm et al., 2010), which
combine LCM and finite mixture models to estimate individual
trajectories. These methods provide a significant advance in the
modeling of dynamic psychological processes in that, in addition
to means, variances and correlations they provide estimates of
the different trajectories and other features of the pattern of
responses over time. However, these are frequentist methods and
inference relies on the assumption of asymptotic normality of the
sample estimates1. While this assumption is generally correct for
group level estimates, it is unlikely to be true at the individual
level without a large number of observations per individual. As a
result, inferences at the individual level from frequentist growth
curve modeling techniques are limited to point estimates and
do not allow for inferences regarding dynamic within-person
processes.
1The finite sample properties of the estimates in LCM and GMM have not been
established.
In the current study, we present a Bayesian approach to the
modeling of individual level processes using a multiple trial task.
Bayesian approaches provide greater flexibility in the modeling
of the pattern of within-person processes at the individual level
because they are not limited by the assumption of asymptotic
normality of the distribution of sample estimates. Given a model
to predict the likely observed pattern of individual level outcomes
and prior assumptions regarding the parameters that describe the
model, Bayesian analyses enable inferences to be made regarding
each individual in a sample.
Bayesian analysis offers some advantages for psychologists
interested in moving beyond group level tests of between-person
differences to study if and how their theories of individual
level processes impact on the observed pattern of within-person
responses. First is the fact that a Bayesian approach allows for
the modeling of individual processes and interpretation of the
pattern of observations for each individual in a sample to see if
they fit the pattern predicted by the theory. Second, the flexibility
of a Bayesian approach requires a priori specification of the
processes that generate observations according to the specific
theory used to generate the hypotheses, including the predicted
pattern of specific values for those observations. The researcher
must be able to describe the dynamic model of the processes
in mathematical terms, thus requiring greater precision than
the prediction of a significant correlation, covariance or mean
difference. Third, in the absence of significance tests, Bayesian
methods require more detailed examination and explanation of
the pattern of results. For example, analyses at the individual
level may reveal that most but not all incremental theorists adopt
a mastery strategy following failure and that most but not all
entity theorists adopt a helplessness strategy. With individual
level Bayesian analyses, we are able to determine how many
and which individuals in each category respond in a manner
that is consistent with the theoretical model and the probability
that each individual responds in a manner consistent with their
categorization.
In the following we will demonstrate how the Bayesian
approach can be used to model within-person processes at the
level of the individual. We use data from 28 professionals who
worked on a complex, dynamic decision-making task and for
whom we also collected data about their implicit beliefs about
ability.
2. AN EXAMPLE STUDY: IMPLICIT
THEORIES OF ABILITY
Two views on intelligence were first described by Carol Dweck
as implicit theories of ability (ITA) and later as mindsets
(Dweck, 1999), which Dweck labeled as entity and incremental
theories. Individuals with an entity theory of ability believe
that intelligence is inherent or natural and therefore fixed and
not readily subject to change. To the degree that experience
and developmental activities make a difference, entity theorists
believe it to be the result of pre-existing natural abilities.
Individuals with an incremental theory of ability believe that
abilities like intelligence are malleable because they are primarily
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the product of experience, effort and developmental activities.
For an incremental theorist, natural abilities are potential to be
developed and realized through developmental strategies and
effort.
As noted by Blackwell et al. (2007) these two different views
of intelligence have been shown to significantly influence how
people react to failure and setbacks when learning new tasks
(Wood and Bandura, 1989; Dweck, 1999; Tabernero and Wood,
2010). In her formulation of the ITAmodel, Dweck (1999) argued
that entity theorists who experience failure or setbacks during
learning interpret the feedback as evidence of a lack of ability
and begin to doubt their capacity to learn the task. If the task is
complex enough and requires full use of cognitive resources, this
self-doubt interferes with subsequent performance and will lead
to a downward spiral. Also, when performing at an acceptable
level, entity theorists will stick with the strategy they know and
not experiment with new strategies that might expose them to
the risk of failure. Thus, in the early stages of learning, entity
theorists will often lock into a strategy that proves suboptimal as
the task unfolds. In contrast, according to Dweck (1999) those
classified as incremental theorists are more likely to interpret
failure feedback as evidence of a poor strategy or lack of effort. As
a result of these attributions to controllable factors, incremental
theorists experience less self-doubt and focus on opportunities
for improvement by changing their strategy or working harder
on subsequent trials, which is more likely to lead to recovery over
time.
Thus, the ITA model leads to the prediction that, at an
individual level, when performance drops, entity theorists are
more likely to spiral further down while incremental theorists
are more likely to recover. As a corollary, entity theorists are
predicted to learn a taskmore slowly and have lower performance
than incremental theorists, as has been shown at the group level
(Wood and Bandura, 1989; Tabernero and Wood, 2010). As
noted above, these aggregated group level results do not directly
test the arguments for the differential patterns of individuals’
responses to failure by entity and incremental theorists, nor
do they demonstrate that the observed group level effects are
the product of the predicted dynamics at the individual level.
The only conclusion that can be made with confidence in
comparisons of the group level learning curves of entity and
incremental theorists is that entity theorists, on average, learn at
a slower rate than incremental theorists. As well as allowing us
to examine group or between-person differences in the average
rate of performance increase (Question 1), a fuller and more
direct analysis of the ITA model at the individual level using
Bayesianmethods also allows us to examine within-person effects
(Questions 2 and 3). Our analyses address the following research
questions:
1. Do individuals classified as entity theorists increase
performance at a slower rate on average than individuals
classified as incremental theorists?
2. Following failure what is the likelihood that an individual
exhibits spiraling, that is further decreases in performance?
3. Is the probability of spiraling higher for individuals classified
as entity theorists than for those classified as incremental
theorists?
In addressing these questions we demonstrate features of the
Bayesian approach for the analyses of individual level processes
and the advantages and disadvantages of that approach. One
important advantage of the Bayesian approach for the testing
of psychological theories, noted above, is the requirement of
specifying how the explanatory mechanisms described in the
model will influence the patterns of responses for individuals,
plus any assumptions built into the model. Consider research
Question 2: To answer this question we need to precisely
define spiraling behavior in formal mathematical terms and
then develop a statistical model to test for its existence.
We define spiraling behavior to be a sustained decrease in
performance so that individual performance trajectories must
be monotonically increasing before the commencement of any
spiral and monotonically decreasing afterwards. If individuals’
trajectories are assumed to be linear2 this means that the slopes
of these trajectories are positive before and negative after the
commencement of a spiral. We will show how we incorporate
this structure into our model via the prior distribution of the
regression coefficients.
The assumption of a prior distribution is sometimes pointed
to as a subjective Achilles’ heel of Bayesian methods but, in
addition to the explicit statement and formal mathematical
modeling of the explanatory mechanism and assumptions made,
the necessity of specifying a prior distribution allows one
to examine the sensitivity of any conclusions to these prior
assumptions. For example, in addressing Question 3, we ask:
How much prior information needs to be imposed in order to
conclude that entity theorists are more likely to exhibit spiraling
behavior than incremental theorists? We can make inferences
about observed differences between entity and incremental
theorists using prior beliefs that a difference will occur with a
probability ranging from 0 to 100%. Researchers using frequentist
statistics are less likely to test the sensitivity of inferences
to the assumptions of their models, because the assumptions
of asymptotic normality are implicit in the methods so that
psychological researchers are often unaware of their existence3.
Another important feature of Bayesian statistics for analyzing
individual level processes is that any event or quantity of interest
can be treated as a random variable. In many theories of latent
psychological variables that influence individual level processes
of learning and performance, the situational event of interest
is the experience of failure or a setback. Failures and setbacks
are the result of many exogenous forces and can occur at
different times for different individuals. This can be modeled as
a random variable using Bayesian methods. By way of contrast,
psychological experiments based on frequentist methods of
inference typically seek to constrain the experience of failure to
a single fixed event, a manipulation, and then use the aggregate
or average group level response to infer individual responses. In
Bayesian analyses, the non restrictive assumption of randomness
may be applied to a parameter that describes a distribution,
such as the mean slope of individual performance trajectories
(Question 1), the probability that an individual will start to spiral
2This is not a necessary assumption, but we use it as a simple example.
3Even when tests for finite samples exist, it is very unusual for psychological
researchers to report them.
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on a given trial, or it may even be one of a set of statistical
models.
These flexible features of the Bayesian approach provide two
benefits for the analyses of the individual level processes in
response to failure. First is that the trial on which a failure
occurs does not have to be fixed but can vary randomly across
trials for individuals. Thus, analyses to address Questions 2 and
3 do not have to assume that the initial experience of failure
is a fixed event that occurs at the same time, or on the same
trial, for all individuals in a particular group. But, when the
experience of failure does occur, be it on trial 3 or trial 10, the
responses of entity theorists and incremental theorists will be
different. The average performance differences of entity theorists
and incremental theorists, even if measured across multiple trials
(e.g., Wood and Bandura, 1989), does not directly test the model
proposed by Dweck (1999) and others (e.g., Blackwell et al.,
2007) which describe the processes at the individual level when
responding to failure events.
Relatedly, Bayesian inference based on the marginal posterior
distribution accounts for the joint uncertainty surrounding all
unknown parameters. This means that a statement such as
“the probability that entity theorists are more likely to exhibit
spiraling behavior than incremental theorists is equal to 0.95,”
accounts for the uncertainty not just in the location of the
commencement of the spiral, but also for the uncertainty in the
size of individual and group level regression coefficients and error
variances. We can therefore be more confident that the effect
is real than if we were to plug-in our best guess of the other
unknown parameters and compute a p-value.
Psychologists interested in analyzing within-person processes
at the individual level will also benefit from the fact that Bayesian
analyses attach probabilities to each individual’s compliance and
non compliance with a hypothesis, rather than just reject or
accept the hypothesis at the group level. For example, research
Question 2 will be answered by computing the probability
of the two competing models, spiraling or no spiraling, for
each individual, based on data available for all individuals. The
resulting posterior probability for an individual provides an
estimate of the probability that he or she will spiral on future
tasks, should we wish to predict the later performance of an
individual. For example, we would predict that individual A, for
whom the probability of spiraling is equal to 0.99, is much more
likely to spiral following failure on a future task than individual B
for whom the probability of spiraling is found to equal 0.51.
By way of contrast, the frequentist approach to hypothesis
testing would classify both individuals as spirallers and predict
that both would spiral following failure on a future task and
not differentiate between the probability of each happening.
Because the observed pattern of performance for an individual
will show that they either spiral or do not spiral, the probabilities
of the different models included in the model averaging process
must add to 1.0. For example imagine two people, individual A
and individual B. For individual A the predictions for spiraling
and not spiraling following failure would be weighted by 0.99
and 0.01, respectively. For individual B, the predictions for
spiraling and not spiraling following failure would be weighted
by 0.51 and 0.49, respectively. Clearly, there would be much
greater uncertainty about the prediction for individual B than for
individual A. Frequentist predictions based on model selection
ignore the uncertainty associated with the model, and ignoring
model uncertainty often leads to p-values that overstate the
evidence for an effect (Hoeting et al., 1999).
As the number of possible hypotheses or models increases
so do the advantages of model averaging over model selection
(Raftery and Zheng, 2003). In this paper we average over a
very large number of models; for each individual there are 11
possible models, the first specifying no spiral, and within the
spiral hypothesis there are 10 sub models, one for each possible
location of the trial on which spiraling begins, not allowing
spiraling on the last two trials. Therefore, for all 28 individuals
the number of possible models is 1128, which is very large indeed.
Likelihood based model selection using frequentist procedures,
such as AIC or BIC, are not feasible when the number of
models under consideration is very large. With such a large
number of models we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods to stochastically search across the entire model space
and predictions are based on a subset of models, rather than a
single model, with these predictions weighted by their posterior
probability (i.e., the probability of model allocation given the
data). Model averaging allows the researcher to ask questions
such as “what is the probability that individual j started to exhibit
spiraling on trial i?”
3. METHODS
3.1. Participants
The participants were 28 managers from various organizations
who were attending a 3-day executive training program at
different times over a year. The 28 participants were all males and
had an average age of 34.15 years (SD= 3.23 years).
3.2. Experimental Task
The experimental task required the participants to manage a
computer simulation of a small furniture production and repair
workshop containing 5 workers through 12 simulated weeks of
business activity (i.e., trials). In this task participants managed
the performance of five employees by assigning them to each of
five tasks required to complete a weekly order. The five tasks
and the 5 employees remained the same throughout the 12
trials. The challenge for the participants was to learn the optimal
match of employees to tasks. The employee performance norm
was set at 100 at the start of the task, allowing participants to
make judgments about their employees’ level of performance
(including increase, decrease or otherwise). Trial by trial feedback
included the task performance of each of the five employees and
the overall team performance. The metric for both employees
and team performance was hours used as a percentage of
budgeted hours for the assigned weekly order, scored so that
better performance resulted in higher feedback scores. By using
this feedback to test decision options systematically, managers
could discover the impact of alternative choices and thereby learn
how to increase the organization’s performance. Therefore, for
each manager there were twelve trials that recorded workgroup
performance indicative of managerial ability, which we used as
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the dependent variable. Further details of the task are described
in Wood and Bailey (1985).
The performance of workers in the simulation had two
components; a deterministic component reflecting the
consequence of the participant manager’s decisions and a
random component. The random component was included so
that participants could not perfectly predict outcomes, which
is a realistic representation of the business world in which
managers operate. Note that we chose a dynamic computer
simulation that was a novel experience for the participants,
for which they had limited expertise and for which they were
required to develop new strategies or adapt existing strategies
(Wood and Locke, 1990). New or adapted strategies require
greater cognitive effort, have a greater risk of further failure, and
require greater persistence in their development and execution
than well-known, routine strategies. It is these efforts that are
potentially undermined by negative self-evaluations.
3.3. Measures
Prior to working on the furniture workshop simulation,
participants completed an 8-itemmeasure of their ITA. The eight
ITA items were taken from the measures developed and validated
by Dweck and her co-workers (Dweck, 1999) and included four
entity type items, such as “People have a certain fixed amount
of ability and they cannot do much to change it,” and four
incremental type items, such as “People can always substantially
change their basic skills.” All items had a 6-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 = strongly agree to 6 = strongly disagree.
The incremental items were reverse scored and the eight items
were added to create a single scale (alpha = 0.87, Mean = 3.41,
SD= 0.69), with a higher score indicating a stronger incremental
theory and a lower score indicating a stronger entity theory of
ability.
A median split was deemed to be an appropriate method
of ITA classification as it is the method of categorization for
the ITA scale used in Dweck (1999). As a result, the raw
data underlying the classifications of participants based on the
median split are no longer available; only the coded data has
been retained. We acknowledge that using a median split is an
increasingly outdated procedure. Nevertheless, we argue that our
data are still informative since an individual above the median
is more likely to be classified as an incremental theorist than
one below the median. Furthermore, the median split provides
simpler inferences, although with some loss of granularity, than
a continuous variable (e.g., consider the research questions in the
Introduction).
Based on a median split of the ITA scores, 14 individuals
were classified as entity theorists and 14 classified as incremental
theorists. Figure 1 shows the performance of the 28 individuals
across 12 trials. Those that are classified as entity theorists are
shown in red (Mean = 108.42, SD = 12.68) and those classified
as incremental theorists are shown in blue (Mean = 112.1,
SD= 15.04).
4. BAYESIAN HIERARCHICAL MODEL
We start this section with a hierarchical Bayesian representation
of what are commonly called latent curve models (Gelman and
FIGURE 1 | Observations on performances over 12 trials for 14
individuals classified as entity theorists (red) and 14 individuals
classified as incremental theorists (blue).
Pardoe, 2006; Gelman and Hill, 2007) and then demonstrate how
the use of prior distributions, together with data augmentation,
can be used to extend and tailor these models to answer the
questions of interest to psychological researchers.
Consider a series of performance measures on J individuals
across T trials. Let Y = (y1., . . . , yJ.), where yj. = (yj1, . . . , yjT)
′
and yjt is the performance of the j
th individual on trial t
and denote f (t) to be some function of time. Our purpose in
this paper is to demonstrate a number of features of Bayesian
methods and therefore we restrict our discussion in the paper
to linear functions of time with normally distributed errors.
However, in Appendix A in Supplementary Material, we relax
these restrictions and consider a nonlinear monotonic function
of time and another error distribution.
One possible Bayesian hierarchical model is
ytj = αj + βjt + εtj, εtj ∼ N(0, σ
2)
αj ∼ N(µα, τ
2
α), βj ∼ N(µβ, τ
2
β), σ
2 ∼ IG(a, b) (1.1)
where αj and βj are the regression coefficients for individual j and
the notation IG(a, b) indicates an inverse gamma distribution
with shape and scale parameters a and b, respectively.
Model Equation (1.1) is a hierarchical one; there are trials
within individuals. The model allows individuals to have
different regression co-efficients and hence different expected
performance trajectories, but the regression co-efficients are
restricted to a distribution that depends upon parameters
common to all individuals. This distribution is assumed to
be normal and the parameters in common are the means,
µ = (µα, µβ) and variances τ
2 = (τα, τβ), of the regression
coefficients. These assumptions are not necessary, but are
commonly used in Bayesian methods for computational ease,
and in frequentist methods because the asymptotic sampling
properties of the estimators are known.
The error term in the first line of Equation (1.1) is the
within-person variation and τ2 represents the between individual
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variation. As τ2 → (0, 0) then all individuals have exactly the
same expected performance trajectory, while as τ2 → (∞,∞)
individual expected trajectories have nothing in common with
each other and may as well be estimated independently. Clearly
the advantage of such a model is that individual trajectories can
be estimated based on only a few data points, by “borrowing"
information contained in data from other individuals. Note that
with only a few data points individual trajectories can only be
estimated; inference surrounding individual trajectories requires
the specification of a data generating process such as Equation
(1.1), or a large number of data points for each individual.
The model specification is completed by specifying a prior on
the hyperparametersµ and τ. In constructing these priors we use
a technique known as Empirical Bayes (Robbins, 1955; Efron,
2005) where the type of prior distribution is specified by the
user and then frequentist techniques are used to determine the
parameters that describe these prior distributions. For example
both µα and µβ are assumed to be independent and normally
distributed, centered around the average of the maximum
likelihood estimates of the individual regression coefficients, with
standard deviations equal to half the range of these quantities. See
Appendix C in Supplementary Material for a full discussion.
4.1. Extending and Tailoring the Model
One of the beauties of Bayesian statistics is that, having
specified the basic probabilistic data generating process, data
augmentation and MCMC techniques can be used to compute
the desired characteristic of any posterior distribution. In this
section we show how to extend the model in the previous section
to answer the research questions described in the introduction.
4.2. Using Priors to Formulate Hypotheses
and Impose Constraints
Research Question 1 is relatively straightforward to answer, so
we discuss our solution to this before tackling Questions 2 and
3. In Equation (1.1) we represented a latent curve model as a
hierarchical Bayes model in which the unobserved individual
regression coefficients, the α’s and the β’s, are generated from a
prior distribution. We now modify this prior to answer specific
research questions. There is no reason to suppose, a priori,
that an individual’s ITA classification affects their performance
before they have received any performance feedback; as argued
above, it is the response to failure feedback and setbacks that
differentiates entity and incremental theorists (Dweck, 1999).
Therefore, we assume that the prior distribution for the intercept
is the same for all individuals, αj ∼ N(µα, τ
2
α). However, in order
to answer research Question 1 we parameterize our prior for the
slope, βj, to depend upon an individual’s ITA classification. Let
µβ = (µE, µI)
′ and let zj = (1, 0) if individual j is classified
as an entity theorists and zj = (0, 1) otherwise. Accordingly
βj ∼ N(zjµβ, τ
2
β
), so if an individual is classified as an entity
theorist then β1 ∼ N(µE, τ
2
β
), and if an individual is classified
as an incremental theorist, then βj ∼ N(µI, τ
2
β
). The difference
in the mean slopes between the two classifications is given by
µE − µI and Question 1 is answered by exploring the posterior
distribution p(µE−µI |Y); if entity theorists increase performance
at a slower rate than incremental theorists then we would expect
this distribution to have most of its support less than zero. Note
that there is not much practical advantage in using a Bayesian
method to answer research Question 1. A frequentist approach,
such as restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation,
would also suffice and we present a comparison of a frequentist
and Bayesian analysis in the Results section.
Answering research Question 2 is more complex. As discussed
in the introduction, the mean function must be monotonically
increasing before and decreasing after the commencement of a
spiral.We use the prior distributions of the regression coefficients
to enforce these constraints. Suppose the regression function
prior to the spiral is given by α1j + β1jt, where the subscript
1 denotes the function before the spiral. If this function is
monotonically increasing then the slope, β1j, must be positive.
Similarly suppose the regression function after the spiral is
given by α2j + β2jt, then the slope, β2j, must be negative. In
addition these two regression functions must intersect at the
commencement of the spiral, which we call the cut point and
denote by cj. To ensure this we need the intercept of the
second regression function, α2j, to equal α1j + cj(β1j − β2j).
So we have three constraints (i) β1j > 0, (ii) β2j < 0 and
(iii) α2j = αj + cj(β1j − β2j), all of which can be imposed
in a logically consistent manner by the prior. We impose the
first and second constraints by assuming that β1j and β2j have
normal distributions constrained to be positive and negative,
respectively. The third constraint is also formulated as a prior
distribution, which is that the intercept α2j is equal to α1j+cj(β1j−
β2j) with probability one. Such a distribution function is referred
as a Dirac delta function. Note that it is not necessary to think of
the prior for α2j as a Dirac delta function, we do so here to show
that Bayesian inference is a coherent framework for imposing all
model assumptions.
4.2.1. Using Data Augmentation to Model Spiraling
In our response to Question 2 we not only want to identify
individuals who spiral following failure but we also want to
determine the likelihood of spiraling for each individual. That
is, we want to be able to say, for example, that “the probability
that participant 10 will exhibit spiraling behavior is 0.64.” Then,
in order to address Question 3 we want to determine if the
probability of spiraling behavior for each of the 28 participants
is related to their categorization as an entity theorist or an
incremental theorist. That is, in addition to modeling behavior
at the individual level, researchers also want to understand
how group level factors, such as ITA personality classification,
affect these individual probabilities of spiraling. In this section
we show how data augmentation can answer these questions
by facilitating the MCMC scheme that performs the required
multidimensional integration needed to estimate the marginal
posterior distributions of interest.
To detect spiraling behavior we augment the data with a
Bernoulli random variable (Be). For each individual we define Sj
as
Sj =
{
1 if a spiral occurs at any time for individual j,
0 otherwise.
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If an individual j exhibits spiraling behavior (i.e., Sj = 1) we
augment the data again with another variable to indicate the
point at which the spiral commences, the cut-point, cj, so that
cj = t|Sj = 1 if individual j begins to spiral at time t. The cut-
point is a discrete random variable, taking values 1, . . . ,T − 2
and we assume a priori that the spiral is equally likely to occur
on any trial, therefore Pr(cj = t|Sj = 1) =
1
T−2 . Note, under
this formulation we do not allow a spiral to begin for the last two
trials. The reason for this is to reduce boundary effects and to
estimate the regression co-efficient with some precision.
Conditional on Sj and cj our model for the performance score
of individual j on trial t is,
if Sj = 1 and t < cj
ytj ∼ N(α1j + β1jt, σ
2),
if Sj = 1 and t ≥ cj
ytj ∼ N(α1j + cj(β1j − β2j)+ β2jt, σ
2)
with
α1j ∼ N(µα, τ
2
α), β1j ∼ NC+ (zjµβ1 , τ
2
β1
),
β2j ∼ NC− (zjµβ2 , τ
2
β2
), (1.2)
and if Sj = 0 then
ytj ∼ N(α1j + β1jt, σ
2)
α1j ∼ N(µα, τ
2
α), β1j ∼ NC+ (zjµβ1 , τ
2
β1
),
β2j ∼ δ(x− a) (1.3)
where a = 0.
The notations NC+ and NC− indicate a normal distribution
constrained to be positive and negative, respectively. The
notation δ(x) means that δ(x) = 1 if x = 0, otherwise δ(x) = 0.
So that, in Equation (1.3), β2j = 0 with probability one.
Note that conditional on an individual spiraling and
the location of the cut-point, the estimate of the expected
performance trajectory is piecewise linear; α1 + β1jt before the
cut point and α1j + cj(β1j − β2j) + β2j afterwards. However,
unconditional on these quantities the estimate of the mean
performance trajectory is not necessarily piecewise linear. Indeed
it will only be piecewise linear if the posterior probabilities of a
spiral and corresponding cut-point both equal 1. Figure 2 gives
an example of the performance behavior of two individuals.
Figures 2A,C show the estimated posterior mean, Ê(ytj), and
posterior probability, P̂r(cj|Y), respectively for individual 20.
Figures 2B,D are the corresponding plots for individual 28. The
fit in Figure 2B is close to piece-wise linear, reflecting the fact that
the posterior distribution of cj is tightly centered around t = 1.
The nonlinear fit in Figure 2A is the result of averaging across
several piecewise linear functions, where the averaging is with
respect to the posterior distribution of the cut-point.
We denote the probability that an individual spirals by
Pr(Sj = 1) = pi, so that Sj ∼ Be(pi) and research Question 2 is
answered by computing Pr(Sj = 1|Y) for each individual. To
answer research Question 3, we allow pi to depend upon the ITA
classification by modeling it as a logistic regression,
pij =
exp(zjδ)
1+ exp(zjδ)
,
where δ = (δE, δI), so that the probability that an entity theorist
spirals is piE =
exp(δE)
1+exp(δE)
and the probability that an incremental
theorist spirals is piI =
exp(δI )
1+exp(δI )
.
We now discuss the prior for δ. If we have no prior belief
regarding the probabilities piE and piI , other than they must
lie between 0 and 1, then the prior on δ should reflect this.
For example in the Appendix in Supplementary Material we
use the prior δ ∼ N(0, cδI2), where I2 is the 2 × 2 identity
matrix, and show that the choice of cδ = 4 corresponds
approximately to a joint uniform prior. Having established a prior
for δ, we answer research Question 3 by exploring the posterior
distribution p(piE − piI |Y). One way of ascertaining the strength
of the relationship between the ITA personality type and the
propensity to spiral is to see how strong our prior belief must be
in order to conclude that there is no relationship. In the results
section we show the impact of the value of cδ has on the posterior
density p(piE − piI |Y).
Appendix D in Supplementary Material shows how data
augmentation is used to facilitate the MCMC scheme that
performs the multidimensional integration needed to estimate
the marginal posterior distributions, p(µE−µI |Y), p(piE−piI |Y).
5. RESULTS
In this section we present the results for two models; one where
the possibility of spiraling is ignored and the other where it is
explicitly modeled. Results are categorized as (i) results regarding
parameters common to groups of individuals; (ii) results
regarding specific individuals; and (iii) results regarding the effect
of priors on inference. Model diagnostics, such as residual plots,
and simulation results which establish the frequentist properties
of the method, are contained in Appendix B in Supplementary
Material.
We present here results for a linear function of time and
normal distributed errors. To minimise the risk that any findings
are a result of model misspecification consequent upon the choice
of a particular function of time, we also obtained results for a
logistic growth function, and errors that have a tν distribution.
The results of these analyses are available in Appendix A in
Supplementary Material and show that the conclusions drawn
from the data are unaffected by assumptions regarding these
error distributions and functions of time.
5.1. Results for Parameters Common to
Groups of Individuals
First, we examine the results when spiraling is ignored, as
described in Equation (1.1). Equation (1.1) could also be
estimated under the frequentist paradigm and we did so using
REML, calculated in the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015).
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Shows the data and fitted line for individual 20, who was classified as an entity theorist. The observed data are indicated by “*” and the posterior
mean of the regression line is given by the blue line. (C) shows the posterior probability of the commencement of the spiral cj . (B,D) are corresponding plots for
individual 28, who was also classified as an entity theorist.
Table 1 reports the results when estimating the parameters
common to groups of individuals using both frequentist and
Bayesian techniques. The results are very similar4.
A Bayesian analysis of Equation (1.1) also allows us to easily
estimate p(µE−µI |Y), the posterior distribution of the difference
between the average rate of learning for entity and incremental
theorists. Figure 3A is a histogram estimate of this posterior
distribution and shows support for research Question 1; on
average entity theorists learn more slowly than incremental
theorists, with probability 0.98. In other words, given the data and
prior, the probability that incremental theorists learn at a faster
rate is 0.98. Figure 3A reports this by showing∼0.98 of the mass
of p(µE − µI |Y) lies below zero.
As noted in the Introduction, when modeling spiraling
behavior explicitly in our data, as in Equations (1.2) and (1.3),
a frequentist analysis is not feasible. We therefore turn our
attention to Bayesian analyses only for the rest of the article.
4 We note that, for the frequentist analysis, the sample size may be inadequate
for Gaussian approximations to the sampling distributions of estimators and
that sampling distributions of estimators of individual level trajectories are not
available.
TABLE 1 | Overall performance baseline (µα) and performance trajectory
(µβ) as described in Equation (1.1) and estimated by a frequentist and
Bayesian analysis.
Frequentist
µˆα
Bayesian
µˆα
Frequentist
µˆβ
Bayesian
µˆβ
Incremental theorists 101.22
(1.77)
101.2
(2.17)
1.67
(0.31)
1.67
(0.38)
Entity theorists 102.87
(1.88)
102.88
(2.21)
0.3
(0.45)
0.32
(0.55)
Standard errors and posterior standard deviations are in brackets.
Figure 3B shows the histogram estimate of p(µE − µI |Y) when
the existence of spiraling is explicitly modeled. A comparison
of the histograms in Figure 3 shows that the difference in the
learning rate between the two ITA classifications disappears after
controling for the possible existence of spiraling behavior.
Figure 4 contains a histogram estimate of the posterior
distribution, p(piE − piI |Y), and shows that the probability of
spiraling is much higher for entity theorists than for incremental
theorists, with p(piE > piI |Y) ≈ 0.96.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Reports a histogram estimate of the posterior distribution of µE − µI, for the model given by Equation (1.1) and f (t) = t and εjt ∼ N(0, σ
2 ). (B) is a
similar plot for the model given by Equations (1.2) and (1.3).
FIGURE 4 | Histogram estimate of the difference in the probability of
spiraling between entity and incremental theorists, piE − piI, for the
model given by Equations (1.2) and (1.3) with f(t) = t and ε ∼ N(0, σ2).
5.2. Individual Level Results
Figure 5 shows the individual posterior mean performance
trajectories for entity theorists (red) and incremental theorists
(blue), for the model that allows the possibility of spiraling.
Figure 5A shows the fit for all individuals. Figure 5B shows the
figure for those individuals for whom the probability of spiraling
was <0.5, and Figure 5C the figure for individuals for whom the
probability of spiraling was >0.5. The three panels of Figure 5
show that while entity theorists are more likely to spiral, not
all do. Five out of fourteen did not. Only one out of fourteen
incremental theorists exhibited spiraling behavior. Figure 5C
also shows that when it is very probable that an individual
spirals, the change in that individual’s performance trajectory is
substantial.
Table 2 shows the posterior probability of spiraling for all
28 individuals. The ∗ and ∗ indicate individuals classified as
either an entity theorist or an incremental theorist, respectively,
for whom the probability of spiraling is >0.5. An estimate of
the median value of the point at which the spiral begins, cˆj, is
given in the last column. This table shows that the probability
of spiraling and the point at which this spiral begins varies
between individuals of the same personality classification and
demonstrates the need to model behavior at the individual
level.
6. EFFECT OF PRIORS ON RESULTS
Figure 6 shows the impact that the choice of the prior variance
of δ, cδ, has on the posterior probability Pr(piE > piI |y)).
Figure 6 shows that the conclusion that entity theorists are more
likely to spiral than incremental theorists is largely unchanged
in the range 1 < cδ < 20. Indeed the strength of this result
can be seen by examining how much prior information needs
to be imposed before the result is no longer apparent. From
Figure 6 it can be seen that cδ ≤ 0.01 before the P(piE >
piI |Y) ≤ 0.5. In other words we must be 95% certain a priori
that the probabilities, piI and piE, lie in the interval [0.45, 0.55],
before we would conclude that, on the balance of probabilities,
individuals classified as entity theorists are not more likely to
spiral than those classified as incremental theorists. For a full
discussion of the choice of cδ see Appendix C in Supplementary
Material.
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Posterior mean of all individual performance curves for entity (red) and incremental (blue) theorists for the model given by Equations (1.2) and (1.3),
f (t) = t and εjt ∼ N(0, σ
2 ). (B,C) are similar plots for individuals for whom the probability of spiraling is <0.5 (B) and >0.5 (C).
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a Bayesian analysis for the testing
of within-person processes at the level of the individual, as well
as providing the group level analyses that are usually reported
in psychological research using frequentist statistical methods.
The contributions and related implications of the reported study
can be broken into three categories, which are discussed in
turn. First, we discuss the advantages of the Bayesian method
for psychologists who wish to study within-person processes
at the level of the individual. Second, we discuss the results
for the Bayesian analyses of the dynamic model of individual
level performance outlined in the ITA model described by
Dweck (1999) and the implications for testing other theories
of motivation and personality at the individual level. Third, we
discuss the functionality of the demands of Bayesian methods for
psychologists.
The Bayesian approach provides several advantages over the
more commonly used frequentist techniques for psychologists
who wish to understand how within-person processes are
manifest in the behavior of individuals. First, it allows inference
at the individual level even when there are relatively few
observations per individual, which is typically the case in
longitudinal studies in personality and social psychology. In the
current study, there were 12 observations per individual and we
were able to test a complex dynamic model as specified by the
theory. By way of contrast, if we were to rely on asymptotic
arguments that underpin frequentist use of aggregate statistics
for inference we would have required many more observations
per person and a complex model of the type tested would
require a sample of manymultiples of that number. Psychological
research is expensive and Bayesian methods are more efficient,
as well as being more effective in enabling inferences about
individuals. This is not an argument for small samples; the
cost of obtaining individual level inference is that one must
specify a model that generates the data and prior distributions
for parameters. Like frequentist methods, Bayesian methods
provide more reliable inference with larger samples. Unlike
frequentist methods, Bayesian inference is based on the posterior
distribution that is calculated using the observed sample. Of
course, in Bayesian statistics a small sample size may mean
the prior distribution has a large influence on the posterior
distribution. Note, however, that one can test the effects of prior
specification on the results, as was done in this study.
Second, the specification of the prior required by Bayesian
methods is a formal mechanism for spelling out the assumptions
and prior knowledge of the theory to be tested. This is a discipline
that is not required by frequentist approaches but one that
will require psychologists to think more critically about the
assumptions and current state of knowledge for the theories they
employ. Psychologists may not think through the assumptions
that underpin the frequentist approaches that they use because
there is no formal mechanism or requirement for them to do so.
Over time, repeated use of Bayesian methods will begin to lead to
common knowledge of priors for different theories and research
questions. The current state of knowledge about a relationship
can be accumulated on a study-by-study basis. Bayesian methods
can also include sensitivity analyses to test for the effects of
different priors on the predicted outcomes, as was shown in the
results of the current study. Such sensitivity analyses can be used
when there is a question about the appropriate prior or when
the circumstances suggest that an established prior may not be
appropriate due to, for example, challenges to an assumption.
The requirement to spell out assumptions and arguments when
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TABLE 2 | Estimate of posterior means for individuals’ probability of
spiraling, Pˆr (Sj = 1|Y ), and posterior medians of the commencement of
the spiral, cˆj , for all individuals classified as entity theorists (red) and as
incremental theorists (blue) with f(t) = t and εjt ∼ N(0, σ
2).
Posterior probability of spiraling
Incremental theorists Entity theorists
Individual # Pˆr(Sj = 1|Y ) cˆj Individual # Pˆr(Sj = 1|Y ) cˆj
1 0.11 0 3 0.24 0
2 0.91* 4 5 0.10 0
4 0.09 0 10 0.10 0
6 0.04 0 13 0.05 0
7 0.12 0 14 0.61* 3
8 0.18 0 16 0.33 0
9 0.04 0 18 0.97* 4
11 0.09 0 19 0.99* 9
12 0.22 0 20 0.95* 4
15 0.38 0 21 1.00* 4
17 0.14 0 22 1.00* 3
23 0.02 0 24 0.34 0
25 0.08 0 26 1.00* 3
27 0.12 0 28 0.94* 1
Average 0.18 0.62
Note that for individual 19, the high probability of spiraling is a result of a low performance
score on trial 12. Figure 9 in Appendix A (Supplementary Materials) demonstrates how
modeling the possibility of large deviations via a t3 distribution mitigates the impact of
outliers.
using Bayesian methods will enable more critical assessments of
the cumulative knowledge in psychological research. It will also
enable more critical evaluation of populist recommendations,
often espoused by consulting firms, that are based on a single
study of unknown validity or relevance to the big picture.
Third, Bayesianmethods enable researchers to jointly estimate
the uncertainty surrounding all parameters. For example, in
the current study this enabled us to treat the trial on which
an individual experienced their first incident of failure that
either did or did not lead to spiraling as a random variable.
For psychologists seeking to predict the outcomes of individual
processes, the ability to model exogenous factors, such as a
performance setback, an action by another person, or some
other unexpected event, as random factors, greatly enhances the
validity of attempts to model the effects of those events.
This study provided the first test of the individual level
performance dynamics of ITA theory. The work of Dweck and
colleagues (Dweck, 1999) plus other psychologists who have
used ITA theory to develop their hypotheses has been based
on an argument that entity theorists respond differently to
failure than incremental theorists. In particular, entity theorists
are more prone to negative self-evaluations following failure
than incremental theorists and these negative self-evaluations
are predicted to undermine subsequent performance and lead
to spiraling. The data from this study are consistent with the
ITA arguments, and further studies are underway to establish
the reproducibility of these findings. The results of the current
FIGURE 6 | The posterior probability that an individual classified as an
entity theorist is more likely to spiral than an individual classified as an
incremental theorist, as a function of the variance of the prior on δ.
study showed that those identified as entity theorists on a prior
independent assessment were more likely on average to exhibit
spiraling following an initial failure than those identified as
incremental theorists.
We estimated the between-person effect based on the
observed within-person response patterns using a bottom up,
i.e., individual to group approach, rather than using group-level
aggregate statistics to infer the existence of specific response
patterns at the level of the individual (top down) as typically
done. We also followed recent recommendations to investigate
psychological phenomena as a function of time (see Roe, 2008).
This enabled us to show not all individuals exhibited the
outcomes predicted based on their categorization as either an
entity theorist or an incremental theorist, and the onset of the
spiraling behavior varied for individuals. These details, which are
important for understanding the dynamics and potential limits
of the theory are lost in the aggregate statistics of group level
analyses. In order to capture these details, we need to model
behavior at the individual level, and allow the timing of the
commencement of spiraling to vary with individuals.
Approximately two-thirds of the participants classified as
entity theorists exhibited spiraling behavior, while the remaining
third did not. This is not an uncommon outcome for predictions
based on personal characteristics, which are probabilistic and
not deterministic. All assessments of the outcomes related to
personality characteristics such as ITA have variability and
counter indicative results that need to be explained. A further
benefit of the Bayesian analyses is that it enables us to identify
which of the specific participants categorized as entity theorists
did not spiral. Additional knowledge of those individuals and
their performance histories can then be explored to see if their
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deviation from the prediction of the theory are due to problems
in the arguments of the theory, boundary conditions of the theory
or the fact that they, for whatever reason, did not experience
failure during the 12 trails of the simulations. For example, some
entity theorists may not have encountered the task conditions
that produce failure or they may have discovered effective
strategies in the early stages of their task experience. Without
the experience of failure, an entity theorist does not experience
the self-doubt that can undermine their subsequent performance
and may behave like an incremental theorist. Without much
larger samples, current frequentist methods cannot identify
the performance responses of individuals to specific events.
As a result, researchers who use those methods often ignore
the variability in predicted outcomes or attribute it to error.
Explanations, when offered, are at the group level and refer to
characteristics of the sample, the task or the context.
The fact that Bayesian techniques provide individual estimates
of the probability of spiraling also has practical implications. For
example, if a teacher or counselor was to provide advice to a
student identified as an entity theorist, that advice would almost
certainly be different for a student with a 0.95 probability of
spiraling following failure in an exam than one whose probability
of spiraling is found to equal to 0.51. As noted earlier, the
hypothesis selection approach of frequentist statistics would
label both as spirallers. The capability of social and personality
psychologists to provide more nuanced, individual level analyses
of individuals who vary from the mean in their assigned
personality category will benefit the clinicians and practitioners
who use those categories in their assessments of individuals
and resulting interventions. The replication and generalization
of the results in further studies will, hopefully, lead to the
development of robust priors, this means a priori reflections
regarding expected effects of tasks, performance profiles and
personality constructs. Also, our results might bring spiraling
as a general class of response patterns into a more process-
orientated focus of attention for different psychological theories
that specify differential reactions to success and failure. Another
benefit of a Bayesian approach is that it allows updating of
estimated probabilities as new evidence comes to hand (rather
than abandon old findings and subscribing to new ones, which
often is perceived by practitioners as disorientating).
Finally, we turn to the functionality of Bayesian methods for
psychologists interested in the study of within-person processes
at the individual level. Given the advantages outlined, we
might ask why aren’t more social and personality psychologists
Bayesian? For established scholars whose careers have been
built on the understanding and use of frequentist methods,
operationalized through standardized statistical packages such
as SPSS, AMOS, and Minitab, the use of Bayesian methods will
present some challenges. Converting the formal mathematical
model of the theory into a statistical model requires the use
of a range of sampling scheme techniques, such as MCMC,
Importance Sampling (IS), and Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC),
to efficiently explore the entire model space. The application of
these schemes is a non-trivial task and one that often requires
mathematical and programming expertise (Browne and Draper,
2006). The flexibility of Bayesian methods to tailor models to
answer specific problems, which is one of its strengths, makes the
development of off-the-shelf standardized methods problematic.
For some researchers who have not had any training in Bayesian
statistics these hurdles may seem insurmountable, but not for
others. Over many decades, psychology scholars have introduced
increasingly sophisticated statistical methods, ranging from
factor analyses to growth curve modeling. Depending upon
the timing of one’s career, scholars have learnt new methods
either during their PhD studies or on the job. Over time the
introduction of Bayesian statistics training in social sciences will,
hopefully, produce a growing body of psychologists who are
adept in the flexible application of Bayesian methods and there
is evidence that this is a current trend (Andrews and Baguley,
2013).
Of course, not all psychologists interested in the study of
dynamic individual level processes need to become experts in
Bayesian techniques. Our experience in this research is that
collaboration between psychologists and Bayesian statisticians
can benefit both disciplines (O’Hagan et al., 2006). Scholars who
develop Bayesian methods benefit because often the application
of current methods to real problems leads to the development
of new methods. Psychologists benefit by being able to construct
formal models of their theory and to employ flexible statistical
models that provide more direct individual level tests of their
theory than less flexible frequentist models. In the current
collaboration, the interaction with the Bayesian scholars required
clear specification of the arguments and assumptions of the
within-person processes in ITA theory and how they would be
manifest in an observed pattern of performance over multiple
trials, which were then incorporated into the formal model. The
specification of the formal model led to greater clarity in the
specification of the arguments for the ITA theory and the use
of highly flexible Bayesian methods enabled the testing of the
specified processes at the level of individuals.
Bayesian techniques have the advantage of being more
adaptable for specific scientific questions than frequentist
techniques. Programs such as R and Winbugs do provide
pre-programmed software for some of the standard Bayesian
methods used in the analyses of mixture models. However,
programmed off-the-shelf software is not yet available for the
Bayesian techniques used in the analyses of the complex mixture
models required to address specific questions such as those
addressed in this manuscript. However, the manuscript provides
an explicit description of the MCMC scheme and Matlab code
and data can be provided by the authors upon request. The
spiraling model may well be one of a general class of models for
different psychological theories that specify differential reactions
to success and failure, as many social cognitive theories do. For
similar, but not identical, applications we argue the collaboration
between statisticians and psychologists is necessary to surmount
these challenges.
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